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Abstract 
 
• This paper discusses the impact of FDI on income inequality. 
• The theoretical ways in which FDI might influence income inequality between 
countries as well as within a given country are discussed, with special attention also 
given to employment generation effects. 
• Revisiting previous research we show that significant effects of FDI are hard to find in 
more recent work, with older studies showing mixed results. 
• Re-estimating the prominent study of Tsai (1995) with newer data we augment it by 
allowing for FDI-influences on inequality by region, income level, and export focus.  
• We find no overall impact of FDI on inequality. Also region and income differentiated 
estimations show no country group-specific impacts of FDI. Only in the export focus-
differentiated estimations we find some evidence of an inequality increasing impact of 
FDI in countries primarily exporting primary goods (without fuel). 
• FDI thus do not have significant implications for income distribution in general. 
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1.  Introduction 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is regarded as one of the main features of globalization and 
has received growing attention since the early 1990s. 
While FDI was described particularly in the 1960’s by dependency theory as an important 
cause of underdevelopment in the Third World, its growth effect today is perceived to be very 
positive. While FDI is seen as a motor of development in many countries growth-wise, and 
therefore large efforts are undertaken to attract it, its effect on income distribution and 
poverty, in contrast, is often described very critically. This is a tendency despite the overall 
consensus on growth being the single most important factor of poverty reduction.3 The 
inequality-raising effects of FDI are seen as more than compensating the poverty-lowering 
growth effect.  
This paper examines the effect of FDI on income inequality both theoretically and 
empirically. In section 2 the theoretical foundation is laid, concentrating on the ways FDI can 
have an impact on the income distribution between and within countries, and on employment 
generating effects of FDI. Section 3 cites some previous empirical findings and sections 4 and 
5 provide our own empirical assessment of the influence of FDI on income distribution 
measured by the Gini coefficient, extending a previous study by Tsai [1995]. Special attention 
is given to effects of FDI in different country groups differentiated by region, income and 
export focus. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Theoretical background 
Inter-country distributional effects of FDI are unclear  
FDI shifts financial resources from one country to another and changes the distribution of 
income within countries. The inter-country effect is described by the interest rate parity. 
Assuming an identical technology parameter, this theory states that capital flows into the 
country with the highest marginal productivity of capital, which results from the lowest 
capital endowment [Hemmer (2002), p. 321]. In comparison to developed countries, 
developing countries are relatively capital-poor, hence capital flows from developed to 
developing countries would be expected. The resulting increase of the capital availability in 
developing countries would decrease their marginal capital productivity. A lower 
remuneration of capital, meaning a lower interest rate, is the consequence, because capital 
then also has to be used in less productive ways. Furthermore, a shift from labor-intensive to 
capital-intensive production takes place so that the productivity of labor and its factor 
payment, i.e. wages, increase. According to the fact that the reverse effect will be observed in 
developed countries, an equalizing adjustment of the marginal productivities and the 
corresponding factor payments to labor and capital in developing and developed countries 
occurs. According to the simple interest rate parity, an equalizing effect of FDI on the 
worldwide functional income distribution is to be expected. But the motivation for capital 
flows is not only based on the current interest rate differences. As indicated by the extended 
interest parity, short-term exchange rate expectations and certain risks are important as well. 
This explains why it could be more rational to invest in a low interest rate country, where 
political and exchange rate risks are lower [Bofinger et al. (1996), p. 313; Hauskrecht (2001), 
p. 16]. Therefore, the effect of FDI on the functional income distribution between countries is 
not clear. 
                                                 
3  There is still widespread consensus on the positive growth effects of FDI even though there is an increasing 
number of citical voices. For a review of the arguments see Mold (2004). 
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Empirically the huge wage differences between countries seem to disprove conventional 
theory on openness and factor price equalization. Several studies suggest though, that there is 
more wage equalization between countries than the raw data reveals at first sight. These 
studies show that wage differences can be explained largely by differences in productivity and 
purchasing power parities [Rama (2003), pp. 2-3] and find a strong correlation between wages 
and productivity. As FDI increase productivity, there is a case for wage increases in 
developing countries via FDI, which would decrease inequality between countries. 
 
Wage effects of FDI within countries can be unfavorable for unskilled workers 
International capital movements do not only cause distributional effects between countries, 
but also within a country. Due to the limited capital endowments and the abundance of labor, 
an unequal functional income distribution is characteristic for developing countries. The high 
concentration of capital combined with high interest rates and the abundance of labor 
(resulting in low wages) lead to an unequal personal income distribution. Capital imports like 
FDI decrease interest rates and increase wages so that a positive shift in the functional income 
distribution occurs. As this shift benefits labor and discriminates only the few owners of 
capital, the effect of capital inflows on the personal income distribution should, theoretically, 
be likewise favorable, i.e. equalizing.  
Empirically, this relationship could not be confirmed on general grounds so far. There is 
evidence though, that the short-term impact of FDI on average wages is positive while this 
effect fades over the next few years. Rama [(2003), p. 6] comes to this conclusion with the 
help of a model explaining the level of wages as a function of the FDI to GDP ratio, 
controlling for country, occupation and year. But FDI also increase the level of wage 
dispersion by occupation in developing countries, thus contributing to a source of income 
inequality [Rama (2001)]. Even though popular international trade theory suggests a decline 
in the wage premium to education, exactly this seems to be the case for FDI. Rama [2001] 
estimates that for an extra one percent of GDP in FDI the wage per year of schooling 
increases by 0.8 percent in the subsequent year. Even though this effect will fade once the 
supply of more educated workers increases, in the short run this leads to more wage 
dispersion and thus more inequality in developing countries. 
Other empirical studies also found evidence of FDI having negative effects on the income 
distribution of developing countries [e.g. Beer/Buswell (2002)]. The reason lies in the 
character of FDI, which is not only a simple capital transfer, but a bundle of human capital, 
know-how, and technology. The expected balancing effect of pure capital flows on the 
personal income distribution and, therewith, on poverty is confronted with other impacts of 
FDI, causing a change in the requirements on workers. FDI leads to more capital-intensive 
production processes [Hiemenz (1990), p. 90]. On the one hand, this increases the demand for 
human capital and, therewith, its remuneration, but on the other hand, it causes a decrease in 
the demand for unskilled labor and its remuneration in developing countries. Better 
technologies will therefore lead to a dualization of the job market as known in developed 
countries. Well-trained specialists will realize top salaries, while unskilled workers earn only 
very small wages [Nunnenkamp/Spatz (2001)]. Therefore, FDI could theoretically raise 
inequality because the described negative wage effects may hurt the income of the poor. The 
evidence on positive wage effects cited above does only take into account wages, thus not 
addressing the question of job creation and job destruction. 
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Short- and medium-term job-creating effects of FDI in a country depend on the mode of 
entry 
FDI affects not only the remuneration of capital and labor, but also the number of employees. 
This fact is of special importance for the poor, because they usually only possess their own 
unskilled labor and have only little or no physical or human capital as an alternative source of 
income. In developing countries the most important effect of FDI on the poor is therefore the 
creation or destruction of jobs [IFC (2000), p. 16]. 
In the short and medium-term it must be distinguished between direct and indirect effects. The 
direct job-creating effect of FDI depends, above all, on the mode of entry. In case of 
greenfield investments, additional jobs will be created surely so that a positive direct effect of 
FDI can be observed. The direct effects in case of a takeover are not clear, even though there 
are several indications that they are negative. For example, the introduction of new production 
technologies often contains rationalization activities, resulting in the displacement of labor. In 
other cases the subsidiary is forced to reduce the production volume, so that parts of the 
enterprise must be closed. It is also conceivable that production and employment expand 
through FDI [UNCTAD (1999), p. 261 and (2000), p. 182]. The decisive question whether 
FDI leads to job creation or destruction is the degree of labor-intensity of the production 
process used by the multinational corporations in the host country [Gillis et al. (1996), p. 
404]. To attract relatively labor-intensive FDI, it is beneficial for developing countries to 
create a FDI-friendly environment and an export-oriented trade regime. Simple manufacturing 
activities, especially, which are designated for export, can create many jobs for unskilled 
workers [UNCTAD (1999), p. 263 and UNCTAD (1994), p. 209]. Some countries achieved 
very positive job creation results by introducing export processing zones, e.g. Mauritius, 
Dominican Republic and Costa Rica. As young women hold many of these jobs, a side effect 
is also the narrowing of the gender wage gap [Rama (2003) pp. 12-17]. Oostendorp [2004] in 
fact finds a narrowing of the gender wage gap for low-skill occupations as a result of FDI in a 
paper utilizing information from the annual ILO October Inquiry over the period 1983-99 and 
analyzing this information in cross-country OLS regressions. 
The World Bank [(1995), p. 74] estimates that between 1985 and 1992 multinational 
enterprises created eight million jobs directly, five million of which in developing countries. 
New estimations state a direct job-creating effect between 17 and 26 million jobs by the 
middle of the 1990s [UNCTAD (1999), p. 264]. Although these estimations have to be 
interpreted very carefully a positive, direct influence is undeniable, but the larger part of the 
job creation is assigned to the indirect effects of FDI, which are assumed to be up to twice as 
high as the direct ones in the manufacturing sector [UNCTAD (1994), p. 192]. Positive, 
indirect effects occur mostly in preceding or subsequent processing stages, if the multinational 
enterprise is well integrated into the local market [Lall (1995), p. 524 and Tuan (1999)]. On 
the other hand, negative, indirect effects, like the displacement of local competitors, can 
occur, whereby this crucially depends on their competitiveness [Lall (1995), p. 525 and 
UNCTAD (1999), p. 261]. The worst case is when domestic companies with traditional labor-
intensive production would be replaced by capital-intensive producing multinational 
enterprises so that more workers are laid of than hired [Radke (1992), p. 51 and 
Altvater/Mahnkopf (1996), p. 267]. Such a labor-saving effect is often strengthened by a shift 
of demand structures towards capital-intensively manufactured goods caused by 
advertisement and international demonstration effects [Hemmer (2002), p. 186]. Even though 
the displacement of domestic workers could be used for an efficiency-strengthening and 
competition-promoting restructuring. This could lead to a stable and/or expanded employment 
in the future [UNCTAD (1999), p. 261]. 
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Long-term, job-creating effects of FDI are good for equality, if the poor hold human 
capital 
In the long term, FDI leads to an acceleration of technical progress. The strength of this effect 
depends not so much on the initial technology transfer itself, but on the speed of the ongoing 
technology upgrading, as a result of the integration of the subsidiary in the multinational 
enterprise [Lall (1995)]. A faster technical progress promotes higher growth and employment. 
Growth is, therefore, a central prerequisite for a sustained poverty reduction, and FDI – via 
growth – can have a positive effect on income of the poor in an indirect way.4  
An acceleration of technical progress, though, will also increase wages in originally very 
labor-rich countries. Then the direction of the long-term job-creating effect depends on how 
the recipient country meets the growing requirements [UNCTAD (1999), p. 263]. Technical 
progress needs an ongoing development of human capital, whereas the importance of 
unskilled labor decreases. This leads to a more unbalanced functional income distribution and, 
because of the high concentration of physical and human capital, to an unequal personnel 
income distribution in developing countries. Because of the fact that poor people have limited 
access to education, their chances on the job market will become worse. FDI leads to a 
relative high and balanced increase of income in those countries that have equally distributed 
education and high educational level [Nunnenkamp/Thiele (2004), p. 13]. On the other side, 
countries with an unequal educational distribution have to consider that FDI leads to a more 
unequal income distribution. 
In summary, the theoretical effects of FDI on income distribution between countries as well as 
within a country are unclear, as mechanisms for equalizing as well as unequalizing effects are 
put forward. The question thus needs to be answered empirically.  
3. Previous research 
Just like in theory, existing empirical studies cannot agree on the effects of FDI on income 
distribution [Aaron (2001), p. 21]. For a small sample of FDI-projects in Venezuela Grosse 
[1998] could not point out a negative influence of FDI on income distribution. Krause 
[(1999), p. 14] assessed a positive influence of FDI on the income distribution for those 
countries, whose institutional and regulative infrastructure is specified to attract FDI.  
A negative influence is found by Chen, Chang and Zhang [1995], who analyzed the influence 
on income distribution in China, as well as Ikemoto and Uehara [2000], who focus their 
analysis on the effects of increasing FDI during the eighties in Thailand.  
More recent cross-country analysis cannot find any influence of FDI on inequality though: 
Bussmann, de Soysa and Oneal [2002] assess the influence of FDI on income distribution for 
a sample of 72 developed and developing countries in various years between 1970 and 1990 
with up to 383 observations. In their OLS analysis of cross-section and time-series data they 
find no significant results for a correlation between FDI and inequality measured by the Gini 
coefficient. Milanovic [2003], assessing the influence of globalization on income deciles 
derived directly from household surveys, also cannot find any significant influence of FDI on 
income distribution. 
 
                                                 
4  In a brief review of the existing literature Nunnenkamp and Thiele [(2004), pp. 11-13] paint a very 
pessimistic picture on the poverty-reducing effects of FDI though. They state that FDI will only contribute 
to poverty-reduction as far as it contributes to economic growth, which in turn will reduce poverty 
eventually. But even for the growth enhancing effects of FDI certain conditions, e.g. a minimum level of 
labor force qualification, have to be fulfilled, which are mostly not met. 
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Most similar to the approach we will follow is the one by Tsai [1995]. He shows that FDI 
leads to a more unequal income distribution, but if regional dummies are incorporated only 
for Asia a negative influence is observed. The sensitivity to the inclusion of regional dummies 
suggests that the correlation observed before is more a reflection of regional differences in 
inequality than due to an observable influence of FDI on inequality.  
The most important result of Tsai’s estimation without regional difference is the significant 
positive correlation between the Gini coefficient as an indicator for inequality of income 
distribution and the stock of FDI: More FDI leads to an increase in income inequality.  
Since differences between regional groups of countries played such a decisive role in Tsai’s 
results, we will revisit the regional differences and also introduce two additional ways of 
differentiation between country groups. 
4. Model 
After the re-estimation of Tsai’s approach with new data the regression will be repeated 
including regional, income and export focus dummy variables. According to Tsai’s basic 
model the Gini coefficient as an indicator for the inequality of income distribution is regressed 
on the following variables describing it’s potential causes: 
- Logarithm of GDP per capita in international prices from 1975 (LNPCGP) and the 
square of LNPCGP (LNPCGP2) 
- Ratio of the FDI stock to GDP times 100 (FDIS) 
- Ratio of public expense to GDP times 100 (GOV) 
- Ratio of agricultural employment to the all-over working population (AGRIL) 
- Ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP times 100 (TRADE) 
- Average annual growth rate of GDP per capita for the last three years (GPCGP) 
- Illiteracy rate (LIT) 
In difference to Tsai’s approach the secondary school enrolment (SEC) indicator, used as one 
of two human capital indicators, is eliminated because of its limited availability and 
explanatory power  
Based on these variables the following estimation equation can be formed: 
 
GINI = c0 + c1LNPCGP + c2LNPCGP2 + c3FDIS + c4GOV + c5AGRIL + c6TRADE  
 + c7GPCGP + c8HCAP + ε 
 
Following this equation the relevant data set contains 139 observations. According to Tsai the 
four following partial samples were build: 
- Sample 1 (all except for six influential outliers) includes 133 observations. 
- Sample 2 (cases of FDIS > 100 or FDIS < 1 are eliminated) includes 117 
observations. 
- Sample 3 (sample 2 is limited to cases of TRADE < 100) includes 100 observations. 
- Sample 4 (from sample 3 all cases with GOV > 23 are eliminated) includes 99 
observations. 
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5. Results 
Table 1 shows the result of our basic analysis. The overall explanatory power is very limited 
with a corrected R2 between 0,214 and 0,285, so that these results have to be interpreted very 
carefully.  
 
 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 
Independent 
variable 
coefficient 
(p-value) 
   
Constant 130,140120 119,518855 182,175769*** 186,271420*** 
 (0,114) (0,167) (0,060) (0,055) 
LNPCGP -29,718431 -25,184986 -41,669188 -43,317244*** 
 (0,168) (0,265) (0,103) (0,091) 
LNPCGP2 2,353829*** 1,996260 3,115417*** 3,238741*** 
 (0,099) (0,181) (0,066) (0,057) 
FDIS 0,058851 0,043161 0,013266 -0,002840 
 (0,309) (0,459) (0,848) (0,968) 
GOV 0,315830*** 0,075637 -0,252969 -0,148818 
 (0,097) (0,712) (0,310) (0,581) 
AGRIL 0,077471*** 0,105000** 0,083578*** 0,077216 
 (0,082) (0,022) (0,081) (0,110) 
TRADE -0,026499 -0,023957 0,026520 0,037246 
 (0,153) (0,200) (0,571) (0,439) 
GPCGP -0,706783* -0,653723* -0,854128* -0,829969* 
 (0,000) (0,001) (0,000) (0,001) 
LIT -0,105765* -0,116904* -0,099779** -0,099536** 
 (0,010) (0,009) (0,036) (0,037) 
Observation 133 117 100 99 
F-statistic 6,614* 4,947* 5,924* 5,936* 
Corr. R2 0,254 0,214 0,285 0,287 
Table 1: Explanation of the Gini coefficient 
As significant finding of the basic estimations can be stated that high short-term growth 
(GPCGP) is the only variable showing a highly significant coefficient in all four estimations 
and has an equalizing effect on income distribution. The illiteracy rate (LIT) shows a highly 
significant result only for the first two, and a significant one for the last two estimations. The 
balancing effect of a high illiteracy rate is unexpected and can be explained by the chosen 
country sample. Illiteracy is one of the main reasons for poverty. Education enables the poor 
to find new jobs and earn higher incomes. If only few people can reap these benefits the Gini 
coefficient increases as a consequence of an increasing literacy rate, i.e. the Gini coefficient 
would decrease as a consequence of increasing illiteracy. But this effect applies only to poor 
countries which represent the main part of our chosen country sample. In more developed 
countries with a correspondingly higher education level an increasing Gini coefficient is 
expected as a consequence of an increase of the illiteracy rate.  
For the most other variables few significant results are found. An inequality-increasing effect 
can be attested to the rate of agricultural employment as a proportion of overall employment, 
even though varying levels of significance are observed, i.e. the stronger a country’s focus on 
agriculture, the more equal tends to be its income distribution.  
Furthermore, the weak significant value of the squared log of real GDP per capita 
(LNPCGP2) in three out of four estimations indicates that the strength of a possible, but not 
confirmed (LNPCGP is insignificant) inequality-raising effect of GDP decreases with an 
increasing GDP. Overall these results do not lend strong support to the Kuznets-hypothesis. 
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Estimations with regional variables 
As the basic analyses show no significant influence of FDI on income distribution a regional 
disaggregation is introduced. As first step, following Tsai’s approach, new estimations for the 
known partial samples are conducted using the following additional variables: 
 Dummy variables for Latin America (LA) and East-South-East Asia (AS),  
 Interaction variables among those and FDIS (LAFDIS and ASFDIS).  
The remaining countries were used as reference group.  
The results, presented in table 2, reveal that regional disaggregation increases the explanatory 
power. Even though the corrected R2 lies between 0,413 and 0,478 and is twice as high as in 
the basic regressions the results also have to be interpreted carefully. 
 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 
Independent 
variable 
coefficient 
(p-value) 
   
Constant 129,878320*** 111,062974 84,324806 88,070162 
 (0,073) (0,152) (0,324) (0,305) 
LNPCGP -30,580370 -22,636573 -13,561231 -14,898417 
 (0,109) (0,269) (0,554) (0,518) 
LNPCGP2 2,278610*** 1,699554 1,033583 1,132123 
 (0,073) (0,211) (0,499) (0,461) 
FDIS 0,118755** 0,081522 0,046903 0,032851 
 (0,032) (0,160) (0,493) (0,643) 
GOV 0,348620*** 0,163976 -0,054410 0,027732 
 (0,057) (0,422) (0,814) (0,913) 
AGRIL 0,133910* 0,135758* 0,115921* 0,110529** 
 (0,001) (0,001) (0,007) (0,011) 
TRADE 0,022812 0,012462 0,020951 0,028281 
 (0,257) (0,551) (0,623) (0,518) 
GPCGP -0,393308** -0,302719 -0,393583*** -0,379099*** 
 (0,032) (0,117) (0,071) (0,083) 
LIT -0,074279*** -0,127231** -0,124343** -0,127409** 
 (0,069) (0,013) (0,031) (0,028) 
LA 15,331805* 11,064584* 9,732151* 9,714735* 
 (0,000) (0,001) (0,006) (0,006) 
AS 1,672738 -3,236921 -3,554954 -3,893645 
 (0,482) (0,296) (0,280) (0,242) 
LAFDIS -0,445775* -0,369429** -0,193692 -0,205429 
 (0,002) (0,014) (0,231) (0,207) 
ASFDIS -0,228653** -0,128031 -0,182690 -0,158469 
 (0,036) (0,270) (0,256) (0,333) 
Observation 133 117 100 99 
F-statistic 10,362* 7,813* 8,547* 8,461* 
Corr. R2 0,460 0,413 0,478 0,477 
Table 2: Explanation of the Gini coefficient using regional dummy variables (part 1) 
The basic results for short-term growth (GPCGP), illiteracy rate (LIT), LNPCGP2 and the 
ratio of agriculture employments to overall employments (AGRIL) can be confirmed. 
Additionally, regarding the two dummy variables, LA shows highly significant results. The 
positive sign indicates a higher level of inequality in this region. In comparison to the 
reference group a positive effect of FDI on income distribution can be observed in both 
regions, for Latin America (LAFDIS) at the 1% significance level and for East-South-East 
Asia at the 5% significance level. 
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Going beyond Tsai’s approach, the remaining reference group is divided again. Thus the 
following regional country groups are formed, according to the World Bank classifications: 
 East-Asia and Pacific (AS), 
 Latin America (LA), 
 South-Asia (SOUTHA), and 
 Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA). 
Observations of countries from “Middle-East and North-Africa” as well as “Europe” (Turkey) 
remain as reference group.  
The results are presented in table 3. The explanatory power of these regressions is higher than 
those containing no or two dummy variables with a corrected R2 between 0,470 and 0,54. 
 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 
Independent 
variable 
coefficient 
(p-value) 
   
Constant 2,556957 15,290398 -13,112290 -4,528078 
 (0972,) (0,847) (0,883) (0,960) 
LNPCGP 2,870093 1,182883 12,625732 10,403195 
 (0,880) (0,954) (0,591) (0,662) 
LNPCGP2 0,168259 0,233296 -0,655752 -0,511239 
 (0,893) (0,863) (0,673) (0,745) 
FDIS 0,034804 0,043051 0,032060 0,017486 
 (0,618) (0,569) (0,679) (0,828) 
GOV 0,216673 0,139974 -0,094302 -0,031172 
 (0,227) (0,502) (0,692) (0,902) 
AGRIL 0,106092* 0,109518* 0,103607** 0,099932** 
 (0,005) (0,006) (0,013) (0,018) 
TRADE -0,000154 0,000121 -0,003477 0,004139 
 (0,994) (0,995) (0,934) (0,924) 
GPCGP -0,214906 -0,231004 -0,279653 -0,276061 
 (0,223) (0,225) (0,196) (0,203) 
LIT -0,076560** -0,124974** -0,145670** -0,152277** 
 (0,047) (0,020) (0,018) (0,015) 
LA 13,374122* 11,967067* 8,344318*** 7,815739 
 (0,000) (0,006) (0,076) (0,101) 
AS -0,127204 -1,844836 -4,830413 -5,695177 
 (0,970) (0,661) (0,291) (0,230) 
SOUTHA -3,646596 5,328111 3,199314 3,006571 
 (0,316) (0,479) (0,675) (0,694) 
SSA 6,302963*** 6,326139 3,650156 3,048163 
 (0,080) (0,120) (0,401) (0,492) 
LAFDIS -0,294516** -0,309412** -0,149471 -0,159097 
 (0,045) (0,049) (0,372) (0,345) 
ASFDIS -0,054694 -0,053557 -0,171628 -0,148764 
 (0,631) (0,659) (0,274) (0,353) 
SOUTHAFDIS -0,305396 -2,048619 -2,222878 -2,289890 
 (0,651) (0,151) (0,125) (0,116) 
SSAFDIS 0,061718 0,040757 0,003451 -0,002435 
 (0,564) (0,723) (0,981) (0,987) 
Observation 133 117 100 99 
F-statistic 10,693* 7,440* 7,828* 7,732* 
Corr. R2 0,540 0,470 0,525 0,524 
Table 3:Explanation of the Gini coefficient using regional dummy variables (part 2) 
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The basic result relating to the illiteracy rate can be confirmed. LIT shows significant negative 
values in all four regressions indicating that the equalizing effect is not region-specific. 
Furthermore, the positive value of the ratio of agriculture employment to all employment 
(AGRIL) verify its inequality increasing effect, whereas only a significance level of 5% is 
reached in the last two estimations. In contrast to the previous estimations GPCGP has no 
significant coefficient, which indicates that fast growing countries with persistently low 
inequality are regionally concentrated. 
According to the regressions with only two regional variables the higher inequality in Latin 
America can be confirmed for all four estimations, even though the level of significance 
varies. No robust results can be observed for the interaction variables of FDI with regard to 
different regions; only the coefficient for Latin America (LADFIS) in estimation 1.2 and 2.2 
is significant. The overall positive coefficient for the regional variable for Sub-Sahara Africa 
(SSA) does not show robustness. Its weakly significant result in estimation 1.2 cannot be 
repeated in the following estimations because of the elimination of observations from the 
more income balanced South-Asia.  
 
Estimations with income variables 
The effects of FDI on income distribution are not only influenced by regional differences, but 
also by the level of economic development. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze differences 
resulting from different income levels. To assess these differences the following country 
groups are formed, according to World Bank classifications: 
 Low income countries (LOW), 
 Middle income countries – lower category (LOWMID), 
 Middle income countries – upper category, and 
 High income countries (HIGH), 
whereas the middle income countries – upper category are chosen as reference group.  
The results are summarized in table 4. Because of the lower corrected R2 the regional 
classification provides more information about the differences in income distribution than the 
classification by income group.  
The basic results of the previous investigations, regarding the ratio of agricultural 
employment (AGRIL > 0) and short-term growth (GPCGP > 0), can be confirmed. Because of 
the common positive connection between illiteracy rate and GDP per capita the insignificant 
coefficient of the illiteracy rate (LIT) can be explained by the significant negative values of 
the dummy variable for low income countries (LOW) and the mostly weak significant 
negative ones for middle income countries – lower category.  
For income differentiated country groups no robust effects of FDI on income distribution can 
be observed. Estimation 3.2 and 4.2 show weakly significant results for the reference group, 
indicating a negative influence of FDI on the Gini coefficient. Because of the insignificant 
coefficient a inequality-increasing effect of FDI in low income countries seems to be 
expected. The influence of FDI on income distribution in middle income countries – upper 
category (LOWMIDFDIS) seems to be positive, weak significant in estimation 4.2 and nearly 
weak significant in estimation 3.2. But all these findings are not robust because they cannot be 
confirmed by the other estimations. 
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 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 
Independent 
variable 
coefficient 
(p-value)    
Constante 146,854636 101,998239 101,464032 118,188665 
 (0,137) (0,353) (0,363) (0,294) 
LNPCGP -28,654774 -14,937487 -13,375323 -18,806669 
 (0,294) (0,622) (0,666) (0,548) 
LNPCGP2 2,015188 1,047112 0,920337 1,311753 
 (0,279) (0,612) (0,663) (0,540) 
FDIS -0,017417 -0,003950 -0,379131*** -0,410144*** 
 (0,895) (0,977) (0,096) (0,074) 
GOV -0,053848 -0,155532 -0,248589 -0,124559 
 (0,794) (0,488) (0,322) (0,650) 
AGRIL 0,104284** 0,116271** 0,121710** 0,116049** 
 (0,019) (0,013) (0,011) (0,016) 
TRADE 0,056287** 0,041130 0,110328** 0,121553** 
 (0,047) (0,175) (0,035) (0,022) 
GPCGP -0,545067* -0,550293* -0,704765* -0,693521* 
 (0,006) (0,008) (0,003) (0,004) 
LIT -0,038747 -0,073309 -0,068611 -0,067790 
 (0,346) (0,129) (0,207) (0,212) 
LOW -14,486470* -11,836397** -18,724615* -18,639761* 
 (0,004) (0,026) (0,003) (0,004) 
LOWMID -7,113873 -8,124981*** -13,661492** -13,154073** 
 (0,120) (0,094) (0,021) (0,026) 
HIGH -23,518076 -16,970197   
 (0,423) (0,578)   
LOWFDIS 0,107530 -0,023199 0,321215 0,345044 
 (0,483) (0,890) (0,167) (0,139) 
LOWMIDFDIS 0,007309 0,029207 0,393331 0,406744*** 
 (0,962) (0,855) (0,101) (0,090) 
HIGHFDIS -0,046056 -0,044986   
 (0,902) (0,908)   
Observations 133 117 100 99 
F-statistic 6,180 4,120* 5,320* 5,356* 
Corr. R2 0,355 0,274 0,344 0,348 
Table 4: Explanation of the Gini coefficient using income dummy variables 
 
Estimations with export variables 
As different industries offer different opportunities for income generation the question 
whether industry orientation of a country affects the influence of FDI on income distribution 
is of interest In order to analyze this question, the previous estimations will be repeated for the 
following country groups, which are formed with respect to country’s export focus, i.e. 50% 
of their exports falling under one category: 
 Manufacturing (MANU), 
 Primary goods (NONFUEL), 
 Fuels (FUEL), and 
 Services (SERVICE). 
Countries with a differentiated export structure are used as reference group.  
The summarized results are shown in table 5.  
The explanatory power of these estimations, measured by a corrected R2 between 0,43 and 
0,48, is higher than that for the estimations with income differentiated variables but lower 
than for the estimations with regional emphasis. 
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 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 
Independent 
variable 
coefficient 
(p-value) 
   
Constant 169,115186** 164,481313** 156,247916*** 162,996731*** 
 (0,034) (0,047) (0,078) (0,063) 
LNPCGP -40,273566*** -35,429107 -34,017109 -37,163608 
 (0,054) (0,102) (0,146) (0,108) 
LNPCGP2 3,140230** 2,672802*** 2,649905*** 2,900874*** 
 (0,024) (0,063) (0,089) (0,060) 
FDIS -0,042697 -0,092458 -0,080120 -0,101924 
 (0,507) (0,172) (0,267) (0,158) 
GOV 0,219270 0,078252 0,059466 0,297452 
 (0,239) (0,687) (0,796) (0,253) 
AGRIL -0,008678 0,004593 0,003499 -0,005639 
 (0,838) (0,916) (0,939) (0,901) 
TRADE -0,013889 -0,025821 -0,057470 -0,049012 
 (0,593) (0,329) (0,234) (0,304) 
GPCGP -0,520898* -0,440735** -0,466594** -0,406276*** 
 (0,006) (0,023) (0,035) (0,065) 
LIT -0,098790* -0,124517* -0,122749* -0,125247* 
 (0,009) (0,003) (0,008) (0,006) 
MANU -6,399463** -10,358229* -15,991501* -17,137710* 
 (0,015) (0,000) (0,003) (0,001) 
NONFUEL 4,863592** 1,876121 3,132643 3,522030 
 (0,030) (0,448) (0,274) (0,214) 
FUEL -6,387672 -6,426641 -7,177976*** -8,353512** 
 (0,116) (0,118) (0,092) (0,050) 
SERVICE 1,594081 0,444022 -0,684736 3,029896 
 (0,644) (0,910) (0,879) (0,532) 
MANUFDIS -0,040399 0,123422 1,536849 1,748077*** 
 (0,767) (0,393) (0,148) (0,098) 
NONFUELFDIS 0,217980** 0,279235** 0,271143*** 0,255478 
 (0,046) (0,014) (0,100) (0,115) 
FUELFDIS 0,302211 0,284669 0,361892*** 0,396645*** 
 (0,146) (0,171) (0,095) (0,065) 
SERVICEFDIS -0,118110 -0,061455 0,065892 -0,191311 
 (0,496) (0,742) (0,758) (0,849) 
Observations 133 117 100 99 
F-statistic 7,921* 6,512* 6,461* 6,815* 
Corr. R2 0,456 0,432 0,469 0,487 
Table 5: Explanation of the Gini coefficient using export dummy variables 
The previous result relating to short-term growth (GPCGP) can be confirmed. On average fast 
growing countries show a smaller degree of inequality than slow growing ones. In all 
estimations the coefficient for the illiteracy rate (LIT) is significantly negative again which 
indicates that a higher illiteracy rate leads to a more even income distribution. The 
combination of the positive coefficient of squared logarithm of real GDP per capita 
(LNPCGP2) at different significance levels and the weak significant negative LNPCGP in 
estimation 5.1 (in all other estimations it is nearly weakly significant) indicates that the 
strength of an inequality-raising effect of GDP decreases with an increasing GDP per capita. 
Unlike in previous estimations, the coefficient of the rate of agricultural employment 
(AGRIL) is not significant due to the significant coefficients of some export focused dummy 
variables. 
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Concerning the export structure countries with an export focus on manufacturing show less 
inequality, as MANU is significantly negative in all estimations. This is probably caused by 
the fact that manufacturing goods are produced by countries, which already have reached a 
higher level of industrialization and therefore have a higher share of qualified workers in their 
labor force. For countries specialized on primary goods exports (without fuel) some 
significant positive result is estimated, but is not robust. In contrast there is an indication for 
less inequality in those countries achieving more than 50% of their exports with fuel. 
Estimations for FUEL are either weakly significant and negative or just fall short of the 10% 
significance level.  
The effects of FDI on income inequality in the reference group show no significant results. In 
contrast the coefficient of countries exporting predominantly primary goods 
(NONFUELFDIS) shows significantly positive results in three estimations. Therefore,  FDI 
seems to increase inequality in countries, which have an export focus on primary goods 
(without fuel), in comparison to those countries, which have diversified export structures.  
 
6. Conclusion 
As main result Tsai’s examination states that the higher foreign capital inflows to a country 
the higher the country’s income inequality! The intention of this paper was to proof or 
disprove this thesis.  
In the theoretical analysis no clear direction of the effect of FDI on income distribution was 
found. A balancing effect of FDI on the world-wide functional income distribution is 
indicated by the simple interest parity but could not be confirmed by the extended interest rate 
parity. The wage effects and the longterm job-creating effects of FDI – both important for 
income distribution – depend on the existing human capital endowment. In summary the 
effects of FDI on income distribution are theoretically unclear. Therefore, this question 
needed to be addressed empirically. As previous research did only provide mixed results, new 
estimations were conducted. Following Tsai’s approach, we re-examined it with new data. 
Using a cross-section analysis Tsai’s results could not be confirmed. 
Even with an augmented version of Tsai’s approach we could not find many significant 
effects of FDI on the Gini coefficient. 
Some results of regressions with a regional emphasis indicate a negative influence of FDI on 
the Gini coefficient in East and South East Asia as well as in Latin America. But this 
relationship is not robust. Furthermore, we found that in countries exporting primary goods 
(without fuel) the effect of FDI on the Gini coefficient is significant and negative.  
In summary we could find only little significant results. This leads to the conclusion that there 
are no general effects of FDI on income distribution. This may not be true for each and every 
country or for each and every investment, but on the grounds of our study no general warning 
about the inequality effects of FDI is justified. It seems that cross-country analysis will not 
yield significant results in the near future, so that efforts should be focused on examinations of 
the effects of FDI at the national level. Nguyen [2003] has conducted such a study for 
Vietnam, more such studies are needed, especially for countries with characteristics which 
appear to be influencing FDI’s effects on income distribution, like a strong focus on primary 
goods (without fuel). 
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